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Abstract
We estimate the risk attitudes of a large sample of small-scale ﬁshers from various ﬁshing
communities along the west coast of South Africa, using subjects’ choices over lotteries with real
monetary prizes. We ﬁnd that participants are moderately risk averse and that risk attitudes
vary with certain socio-demographic variables. In particular, females are found to be more risk
averse than their male counterparts, while quota holders are more risk loving. Logistic regres-
sion analysis indicates that risk attitudes have implications for non-compliance with ﬁsheries
regulation. Speciﬁcally, greater risk aversion translates into a reduction in the odds of catching
illegally. Furthermore, in the case of gender, female ﬁshers and female ﬁshers with ﬁshing rights
are more likely to comply with ﬁsheries regulation. These ﬁndings have important implications
for the characterisation of risk attitudes in ﬁsheries policy applications and for the management
of marine resources.
Keywords risk attitudes risk aversion experiments ﬁshing rights compliance and South Africa
JEL Classiﬁcations D81 and Q22
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Financial risk is embedded in the economic environment within which commercial and small-scale
ﬁshers operate: such risk derives from product price uncertainty, imperfect information regarding
resource stocks and location, dynamic changes in stock levels and prices, and the evolvement of
ﬁsheries regulation (Smith and Wilen 2005; Eggert and Lokina 2007). As such, uncertainty and
appetite for risk are important elements of any analysis of ﬁsher behaviour (Mistian and Strand
2000).
In this study, we estimate the risk attitudes of a large sample of individuals from various ﬁshing
communities along the west coast of South Africa, using subjects’ choices over lotteries with real
monetary prizes. The majority of the subjects are involved in ﬁshing-related activities. The rele-
vance of this study stems from the persistence of non-compliance in South African ﬁsheries — despite
as i g n i ﬁcant strengthening in law enforcement over the past decade (Hauck 2009). Understanding
ﬁshers risk preferences is an important aspect of any analysis of ﬁshers’ behaviour (Eggert and Mar-
tinsson 2009). In this context, we characterise risk attitudes in these coastal communities in order
to obtain a greater understanding of the factors inﬂuencing non-compliance. Hauck (2009) empha-
sises that a better understanding of the factors aﬀecting ﬁsheries non-compliance is a prerequisite
in developing a more inclusive management strategy.
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1Much of the empirical literature on ﬁshers’ risk preferences indicates that ﬁshers are risk averse
(Dupont 1993; Mistian and Strand 2000; Eggert and Tveteras 2004; Smith and Wilen 2005). In their
seminal work, Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) analyse the annual location and species choices of New
England ﬁshers under conditions of uncertainty and inertia, using a random utility model. Fishers
are found to have homogenous risk preferences - with a constant relative risk aversion coeﬃcient
equal to one. Dupont (1993) extends this analysis by adding price uncertainty to Bockstael and
Opaluch’s (1983) framework of annual ﬁshery participation choices. The assumption that ﬁshers are
homogenously risk averse could not be rejected in three of four vessel types. Mistian and Strand
(2000), examine short-run location choices in the North Atlantic ﬁshery using data from around 2500
ﬁshing trips taken by approximately 260 vessels. The authors ﬁnd that risk preferences amongst
ﬁshers are heterogeneous and that 95% of ﬁshing trips reﬂect risk aversion. Eggert and Tveteras
(2004) study the short-run gear-choice decisions of Swedish demersal trawl ﬁshers using trip data.
The authors ﬁnd that 70% of trips are characterised by risk aversion. Smith and Wilen (2005) use
a random utility model to examine the daily ﬁshing choices of commercial Californian sea urchin
divers in response to both physical and ﬁnancial risk. Sea urchin divers are found to be risk averse
on average across both risk domains, preferring low revenue variance and calm seas. Results from
recent experimental studies of ﬁshers’ risk preferences have proved to be less conclusive: Eggert
and Martinsson (2004) ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant portion of ﬁshers are characterised by risk-neutrality.
Speciﬁcally, the authors elicit the risk preferences of Swedish commercial ﬁshers using a stated
preference technique (choice experiment). Participants choose between pairs of ﬁshing trips with
variable minimum, maximum and mean income levels. The authors ﬁnd that 48% of ﬁshers are
risk neutral, 26% of ﬁshers are moderately risk averse and 26% are strongly risk averse. Eggert
and Lokina (2007) measure the risk preferences of Tanzanian artisanal ﬁsherman using subject
choices from an array of hypothetical ﬁshing trips with diﬀerent expected mean revenue and income
variability. Using the relative risk premium speciﬁcation, the authors classify 32% of ﬁs h e r sa sr i s k
averse, 34% as risk neutral and 34% as risk seeking. Nguyen (2009) simultaneously estimates risk
and time preferences of ﬁshers from various Vietnamese ﬁshing villages. Subjects are assumed to
behave in accordance with Prospect Theory. The author ﬁnds that ﬁshers are less risk averse than
subjects in alternate occupations.
Most studies of ﬁshers’ risk behaviour analyse commercial ﬁsheries in developed countries (Eg-
gert and Lokina 2007). While, to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study of small—scale ﬁshers’ risk
behaviour in a South African setting, in a broader context this study adds to the limited body of
work on the risk preferences of small—scale ﬁshers in a developing country context.
Our results indicate that the average participant is moderately risk averse and that risk attitudes
vary with certain demographics. In particular, females, female ﬁshers and female rights holders are
more risk averse than their male counterparts. These same subjects are also found to be more likely
to comply with ﬁsheries regulation. As such, facilitating greater industry access for females has
positive implications for achieving compliance. This is signiﬁcant given that, during the time of
these experiments, quota reforms had granted greater access and larger quotas to female (and black)
ﬁshers — creating considerable tension within these communities (Visser and Burns 2007).
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we provide an overview of the sample. The basic
design of the experimental tasks as well as issues related to ﬁeld setting and subject recruitment are
reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 provides a brief overview of the expected utility speciﬁcation while
the results follow in Section 5. The implications for compliance are outlined in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2S a m p l e
We study the risk attitudes of a large sample of individuals from nine diﬀerent ﬁshing communities
along the west coast of South Africa. We chose these communities in order to recruit subjects
2who are more representative of individuals aﬀected by public policy changes in the management of
South Africa’s ﬁsheries and who would have continuous exposure to conﬂict over natural resource
management.
We use a sample of 555 subjects.1 Table 1 provides a review of the sample statistics. On average,
participants were 40 years old and had lived in their respective communities for most of their lives
(just over 30 years). Participants almost exclusively spoke Afrikaans as their ﬁrst language — with
the exception of Community 1 and 2. Around 60% of the respondents were male, although this
varies signiﬁcantly by community. In terms of race, 66% of the subjects classiﬁed themselves as
Coloured, while a majority of the remaining participants classiﬁed themselves as Black or Other.
Educational attainments amongst participants are low. Subjects had, on average, obtained eight
years of education (grade 8/standard 6). Just over 1% of the sample reported having no primary
school education at all.2 Approximately 33% had obtained some primary education; only 14% of
this grouping had completed their primary schooling. Likewise, of the 63% who reported having
obtained some high school education, only 9% had completed their grade 12 exam. Finally, only 3%
of the sample had obtained a tertiary qualiﬁcation.
Unemployment is high throughout the sample. Speciﬁcally, only 48% of participants reported
having a job at the time of the survey. Approximately 62% of households are food insecure.
Approximately 67% (372 individuals) are involved in ﬁshing-related activities. This is a broad
category consisting of: subjects that spend a minimum of 2 days a week ﬁshing; subjects who are
breadwinners in households where ﬁshing has been the primary source of income over the past 12
months; subjects with ﬁshing rights, subjects living with household members with ﬁshing rights and
s u b j e c t sb e l o n g i n gt oac r e ww h or e c e ived rights. The mean income from ﬁshing-related activities
is $119 per month3. Around 70% of subjects involved in ﬁshing related activities are male.
With respect to the allocation of ﬁshing rights, around 46% of the total sample (258 individuals)
have themselves been allocated or work for a crew that has been allocated a quota and/or a permit
(from here onwards described as rights).4 Approximately, 72% of these rights holders are male.
Furthermore, an additional 22 individuals live with a household member who has been allocated
rights.
Of those 372 subjects involved in ﬁshing related activities, 5% (167 individuals) are unemployed.
Thus, of the 286 individuals in the total sample that are unemployed, 58% are involved in ﬁshing-
related activities. Of these unemployed subjects engaging in ﬁshing-related activities, 66% (110
subjects) are rights holders. Isaacs et al. (2007) notes that, in transforming the ﬁshing industry
after apartheid, Marine and Coastal Management broadened the number of historically disadvan-
taged rights holders. However, in many cases, allocations have been too small to produce suﬃcient
livelihoods.
Mean household per capita income for the whole sample was $47 per month, exceeded by the
mean monthly household per capita expenditure of $55 per month. Note that income measures vary
considerably across the diﬀerent communities in the sample. In terms of the allocation of ﬁshing
rights, 70% of subjects perceive the oﬃcials allocating rights to be corrupt, while 78% perceive the
allocation process to be unfair.
1569 individuals were recruited. However, 14 subjects were excluded from the analysis: 1 participant left before
completing all lottery tasks, 2 participants omitted important information and 11 participants made three or more
inconsistent choices. The presence of inconsistent choices is not uncommon in research that does not force a switching
point (Jacobson and Petrie 2008). In our case, 41% of subjects made at least 1 inconsistent choice. A Fechner
error speciﬁcation is used to account for any behavioural errors made by the subjects, for example through lack of
understanding, carelessness or inattentiveness (Hey and Orme 1994).
2Participants had no formal schooling or had only completed Sub A or Sub B.
3ZAR/USD = 7.02020415 on 26 February 2011
4Where a quota refers to a quantity that is harvested and a permit refers to harvesting in a speciﬁed period.
Participants were asked whether they were quota holders for any of the following species: West Coast rock lobster,
abalone, hake (longline or trawl), or purseine ﬁshing. Participants were asked whether they had ﬁshing permits for
any of the following species: recreational West Coast rock lobster, line-ﬁsh or pelagic species.
33 Experiment design
The following sections outline the experiment design, ﬁeld setting and recruitment.
3.1 Risk experiment — basic design
We use a multiple price list (MPL) design to elicit risk attitudes. The MPL is a standard format
whereby subjects are provided with rows of paired lottery options and, in each row, choose one of
the lottery options (Andersen et al. 2006). The MPL design has been used to elicit risk attitudes by,
among others, Holt and Laury (2002) and Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010). The MPL can be
explained to subjects and implemented with relative ease; because one of the rows is later selected
at random to be played, the MPL encourages truthful revelation (Andersen et al. 2006).
Before commencement of the experiments, the subjects were provided with documentation de-
tailing the instructions and outlining the diﬀerent lottery tasks. The instructions were also read
aloud and subjects were encouraged to ask questions. The reader is referred to Appendix A and B
to view this documentation.
Table 2 replicates the eight tasks presented to subjects. For each binary-choice lottery task,
subjects picked either Lottery A or Lottery B.5 Given the low literacy rates of subjects and the fact
that the participants had little or no experience with experiments, the experiment was kept as simple
as possible. For this reason, ﬁxed probabilities of 100% and 50% were used in the experiment.6 In
the ﬁrst task, subjects have a 100% chance of receiving R20 (approx. US$3) under Lottery A; under
Lottery B they have a 50% chance of receiving R20 and a 50% chance of receiving nothing. The
payoﬀ associated with Lottery A declines systematically throughout the eight tasks, while the payoﬀ
for Lottery B remains unchanged. The expected values of the two lotteries, which are replicated in
the fourth and ﬁfth columns of Table 2, were not shown to subjects. A risk-loving participant would
choose Lottery B in the ﬁrst lottery task, while a risk-averse subject would choose Lottery A in the
eighth lottery task (Harrison et al. 2005). As a risk-neutral participant should change from Lottery
A to Lottery B when the expected value of both is approximately the same (Harrison et al. 2005b),
a risk-neutral participant would select Lottery A for the ﬁrst three tasks and Lottery B thereafter.
Following the discussion in Andersen et al. (2008) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006), we assume a
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function deﬁned over the non-negative lottery prize.
The CRRA function is of the form U(x)=( x1−r)/(1 − r) where x is the lottery prize and r is the
latent risk coeﬃcient.
After the experiment was concluded, one of the eight tasks was selected at random and played for
real money.7 This mechanism motivates participants to consider each choice carefully and rewards
participation (Harrison et al. 2010). Participants were told upfront they could not lose any money,
irrespective of which lotteries they selected. Besides it being morally indefensible to ask low-income
participants to gamble their own money during experiments, subjects would be constrained from
choosing riskier alternatives should their own money be at risk, introducing the eﬀect of liquidity
constraints into the analysis (Binswanger 1980).
3.2 Field setting and recruitment
As outlined in Visser and Burns (2007), the experiments were performed manually with a sample of
569 participants in ﬁeld laboratories across nine communities. Various methods were used to recruit
participants to minimise the potential for sample selection problems: speciﬁcally, participants were
5An explicit indiﬀerence option was not provided.
6Our experiment design is theoretically similar to that of Holt and Laury (2002), but diﬀers in that, instead of
changing probabilities and ﬁxing payoﬀs, we ﬁx probabilities and change payoﬀs.
7The subjects were told before the experiment commenced that at the end of the session one of them would be
asked to draw a number between 1 and 8 out of a bag. The number randomly selected from the bag represents the
lottery task that was elected for payout.
4recruited through the use of community leaders, ﬁshers’ associations, local newspapers and ﬂyers,
and adverts in community centres and harbours (Visser and Burns 2007). Both males and females
were targeted for participation, given that ﬁshing rights have been allocated to women in the last
half a decade.
At least one month prior to the execution of the experiments, participants attended an initial
session during which they completed a comprehensive questionnaire covering a wide demographic
spectrum including their socio-economic background, employment activities, ﬁshing experience; and
including a host of attitudinal questions (Visser and Burns 2007). These participants were allocated
randomly to groups for the risk experiments which took place one month later (Visser and Burns
2007).
4 Choice under uncertainty: Expected-utility speciﬁcation
A brief exposition of the estimation procedure follows. The discussion is derived from the following
studies: Harrison et al. 2008, 2009, 2010; and Andersen et al. 2008, 2010, 2011.
Under an expected-utility theory (EUT) speciﬁcation of choice under uncertainty, we assume a
constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function deﬁned as U(x)=
(x1−r)
(1−r) where x signiﬁes
the lottery prize and r is the CRRA coeﬃcient to be estimated: with r =0denoting risk neutrality,
r>0 indicating risk aversion, and r<0 denoting risk loving (Andersen et al. 2008).
If there are k possible lottery outcomes and the probabilities for each lottery outcome, p(k),a r e
speciﬁed by the experimenter, then expected utility (EU) for lottery task i is denoted as: EU = P
k=1,K(pkxUk), where expected utility is the utility of each lottery outcome weighted according
to its probability (Harrison and Rutström 2008). The EU of each lottery task is calculated “for a
candidate estimate of r" (Harrison et al. 2009:8), enabling us to calculate the following latent index:
5EU =( EUR − EUL)/μ where EUR is the right lottery (risky Lottery B), EUL is the left lottery
(safe Lottery A) and μ is a Fechner noise parameter8 (Andersen et al. 2008). Following Harrison and
Rutström (2008), 5EU index is linked to the subjects’ observed choices using cumulative probability
distribution function, Φ(5EU).
The conditional log-likelihood is reﬂected as:
lnLEUT(r;μ,y,X)=
X
i[(lnΦ(5EU)|yi =1 )+( l nΦ(1 − (5EU))|yi =0 ) ] (1)
where yi =1 ( 0 )denotes the choice of the right (left) lottery in task i,a n dX is a vector of
individual characteristics (Harrison and Rutström 2008).
We include a number of independent variables in the model. Six are binary variables indicating
the subjects’ gender (Female), racial classiﬁcation (Coloured), employment status (Unemployed),
whether the subject is the breadwinner (Breadwinner), whether the subject is involved in ﬁshing-
related activities (Fisher), whether the subject is a rights holder (Rights), and ﬁnally, a relative
income variable describing whether the familys’ ﬁnancial status is perceived as middle income to
rich, as opposed to lower income to poor (Relative inc.). We also include age in years (and age in
years squared), education in years (and education in years squared) and monthly income.
The model is replicated for three diﬀerent samples: (i) the full sample, (ii) a sample of those
participants involved in the ﬁshing industry (ﬁshers), and (iii), a sample of ﬁshers with ﬁshing rights.
Given the possibility of correlation between responses by the same subject, the standard errors
are adjusted for clustering (Harrison et al. 2009).
8T h eF e c h n e re r r o rs p e c i ﬁcation, popularised by Hey and Orme (1994), account for any errors made by the subjects;
in the case of a binary lottery, this is when the probability of selecting one of the lotteries is not equal to one, despite
the expected utility of that lottery exceeding the expected utility of the other (Harrison and Ruström 2008).
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Table 3 presents the estimates from the expected-utility theory speciﬁcation. Panel A replicates
the results for the full sample assuming no covariates. The remaining panels signal the eﬀects of
demographic characteristics on risk attitudes. Speciﬁcally, panel B replicates the results for the full
sample including covariates; panel C presents estimates for the sample of subjects involved in ﬁshing-
related activities (ﬁshers) and panel D replicates results for a sample of subjects involved in ﬁshing-
related activities who have been allocated ﬁshing rights. For this CRRA speciﬁcation, negative
values denote risk loving, a value of zero indicates risk neutrality and positive values denote risk
aversion (Harrison et al. 20010). The regression-model coeﬃcients are interpreted as the marginal
eﬀect of each variable as compared to the default case (Harrison et al. 2007).
As evident from panel A, the coeﬃcient of CRRA is estimated to be 0.393 (p-value = 0.000),
implying moderate risk aversion. While this result is comparable to estimates obtained in developed
and developing countries using comparable methods, it indicates a lower average degree of risk
aversion. Harrison et al. (2010) (Ethiopia, India and Iganda) estimate the coeﬃcient of CRRA to
be 0.54; Galarza (2009) (Peru) derives an estimate of 0.45 when including covariates.
There is a signiﬁcant eﬀect from age: Panel B: 0.023, p-value = 0.034; Panel C: 0.021, p-value
= 0.049. Risk aversion increases with educational attainment across all sub-samples (Panel B: 0.09,
p-value = 0.015; Panel C: 0.085, p-value = 0.057; and Panel D: 0.091, p−value = 0.059). Tanaka et
al. (2010) ﬁnd that subjects that are both older and more educated are more risk averse.
Females are more risk averse than men (Panel B: 0.254, p-value = 0.0004). This is in line with
Croson and Gneezy’s (2009) review of the experimental literature relating to gender diﬀerences in
risk behaviour. They ﬁnd that women are consistently more risk averse than men. Our results
further indicate that female ﬁshers (Panel C: 0.266, p-value = 0.005) and female ﬁshers with ﬁshing
rights (Panel D: 0.296, p-value = 0.023) are also more risk averse than their male counterparts. These
results may have positive implications for compliance with ﬁsheries regulation, given the increased
presence of females in the ﬁshing industry in the last half a decade.
In line with the results of Binswanger (1980) and Mosley and Verschoor (2005), we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant correlation between risk attitudes and wealth across all sub-samples. This ﬁnding is
inconsistent with the commonly held assumption of Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA).
We also ﬁnd that subjects involved in ﬁshing-related activities are more risk averse than workers
in alternate occupations: risk aversion increases by 0.184 if the subject is involved in ﬁshing-related
activities (Panel B: p-value = 0.054).
Finally, rights holders are less risk averse than non-rights holders (Panel B: -0.139, p-value =
0.044; Panel C: -0.131, p-value = 0.049).9
6 Exploring the relationship between risk aversion and com-
pliance
Engaging in illegal activities is synonymous with engaging in risky behaviour. Using an expected
utility framework, Eisenhauer (2004) concludes that risk aversion acts as a deterrent to "sin". In this
context, we use the estimated (experimental) risk preferences to examine the relationship between
risk and non-compliance (catching illegally). Assuming that the probability of detection is suﬃciently
large and the punishment for transgression suﬃciently severe, we anticipate risk-averse subjects to
be less likely to catch illegally relative to their more risk-loving counterparts.
9An area for future research would be to determine whether risk loving individuals become rights holders or whether
rights holders become more risk loving during the course of their ﬁshing activities.
66.1 Analysis of those catching illegally
The results from the risk analysis indicate that (i) female ﬁshers are more risk averse, (ii) female
ﬁshers with rights are more risk averse, and (iii), rights holders are more risk loving. We analyse
the implication of these ﬁndings for resource usage by analysing subjects’ responses to questions of
compliance.
Subjects answered a number of questions around issues of compliance. These questions ascer-
tained: (i) whether subjects have caught more than their quota states, ﬁshed outside the speciﬁed
dates of their permit, or ﬁshed without a quota or permit; (ii) the number of times subjects have
been charged or arrested for violating ﬁshing regulations in the previous year; (iii) whether it was
correct that they were charged or arrested on these occasions; and (iv), whether they stopped vi-
olating the regulations after being charged or arrested. We used subjects’ responses to the above
questions to collate a list of subjects who have violated ﬁsheries regulation.
We calculate that 180 subjects (32% of the sample) have caught illegally. Around 16% of the
sample (87 subjects) indicated directly that they had caught more than their quota states, ﬁshed
outside the speciﬁed dates of their permit, or ﬁshed without a quota or permit (the answered question
(i)). An additional 93 subjects, who did not answer question (i) but answered question(s) (ii), (iii)
and/or (iv), were added to the list of participants who have caught illegally. With regard to question
(ii), 31 subjects have been charged or arrested once in the past 12 months for violating ﬁsheries
regulations, while 12 subjects have been charged/arrested twice and 7 subjects have been arrested
three or more times over the same period. With respect to question (iii), 33 subjects indicated
that it was correct that they were charged/arrested, while 10 subjects noted that it was correct on
some occasions and 84 subjects stated that it was not correct. With respect to question (iv), 38
subjects that been charged/arrested said they had changed their behaviour, while 15 subjects noted
that their behaviour changed after being charged a few times. Seventeen subjects stated that being
charged did not change their behaviour. Of these 180 subjects, 158 are involved in ﬁshing-related
activities and 22 are involved in non-ﬁshing-related activities.
Table 4 provides a breakdown of those 180 subjects who have violated ﬁshing regulations. Males
are responsible for the majority of violations. Speciﬁcally, of those catching illegally, 83% are male.
A two-sample Wilcoxon non-parametric test conﬁrms that males typically tend to overﬁsh more
relative to females (z =1 9 .918,p<0.01). This result supports our experimental ﬁnding that women
are more risk averse.10
Around 90% of poaching/overﬁshing is carried out by ﬁshers (subjects involved in ﬁshing-related
activities). Of these ﬁshers who catch illegally, 86% are male. While the dominance of males in
terms of non-compliance is explained by their larger presence in terms of absolute numbers in the
ﬁshing industry (see sample statistics), in percentage terms, only 17% of all female ﬁshers have
acknowledged poaching/overﬁshing versus 50% of men.
In terms of ﬁshing rights, 79% of those overﬁshing have rights or work for a crew that has been
allocated rights. This result explains the prevalence of illegal activities carried out by ﬁshers. Of
those 180 subjects catching illegally, 158 are ﬁshers. This seems to contradict our ﬁndings that
ﬁshers are more risk averse. However, of these ﬁshers, 77% are rights holders. Thus, of ﬁshers who
catch illegally, the large majority are rights holders.
Of these rights holders who overﬁsh, 86% are male. Once again, the fact that overﬁshing is
10A discussant queried whether woman may be less inclined (than men) to report their illegal activities given that
they are more risk averse. It is more likely that, given the possibility of being apprehended and charged, a higher degree
of risk aversion in females manifests in a reduction in illegal ﬁshing activities relative to men. As will be discussed
in Section 7, correspondence with oﬃcials from the compliance division of Marine and Coastal Management conﬁrm
that fewer women are charged in connection with illegal ﬁshing activities than men: Speciﬁcally, in the Overberg, in
the past 5 years, about 89 women have been charged in connection with poaching, compared to around 1200 men
(personal communication). However, we do not know the proportion of male and female ﬁs h e r si nt h i sr e g i o na n d
assume that there are more male ﬁshers relative to females. Finally, all respondents were assured that their answers
would remain anonymous and that researchers solely represented the University of Cape Town; there is no reason to
believe that women where more sceptical of these assurances than men.
7undertaken predominantly by male rights holders reﬂects the small presence of female rights holders
in the industry. However, as a percentage, 23% of female rights holders have admitted to catching
illegally, versus 57% of male rights holders. The two-sample Wilcoxon non-parametric test conﬁrms
that non-compliance stems from rights holders (z = −15.820,p < 0.01). While it seems intuitive
that rights holders’ active role in illegal catching may be due to the fact that they have a plausible
reason to be out on the water ﬁshing, our experimental ﬁndings in Table 2 indicate that having
access to ﬁshing rights has a direct impact on individuals’ level of risk preferences. Our results show
that rights holders are both less risk averse and more likely to engage in poaching activities.
Just less than 90% of those catching illegally perceive ﬁshing rights to be allocated unfairly,
while 78% feel that the oﬃcials allocating quotas are corrupt. Again, from the non-parametric tests,
those who perceive the quota allocation process to be unfair (z = −7.048,p < 0.01) and corrupt
(z = −7.646,p<0.01) typically overﬁsh/poach more relative to those who do not.
6.2 Linking risk attitudes and compliance
The relationship between risk attitudes and compliance is assessed more formally with the use of
logistic regression analysis — the results of which are displayed in Table 5. The dependent variable,
overﬁsh, takes on a value of 1 if subjects have caught illegally.
Panel B is analogous to Table 3 in that it contains the same set of covariates.
Additional variables have been added in panel C: Compliance is also a measure of cooperation
in a common-pool resource11 (CPR) context and constitutes an important social norm. Evidence
from the lab indicates that the sanctioning of free-rider in a CPR and public good context promotes
cooperation (Ostrom 2000, Ostrom et al. 1994, Ostrom et al. 1999, Fehr and Fischbacher 2004,
Gächter and Herrmann 2009, Ledyard 1995, Gächter 2007). In a public good setting, Fehr and
Gächter (2000), Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Anderson and Putterman (2006) ﬁnd that punishment
increases as the diﬀerential between individual contributions and average group contributions widens,
while Gächter et al. (2008) conclude that deviations from the punisher’s contribution are sanctioned.
It is evident that subjects, in collective action dilemmas, will punish below—average contributors (at
their own personal cost). For this reason we include social sanctioning as a proxy for cooperativeness.
A ss u c h ,w ei n c l u d ei nt h em o d e lt h ev a r i a b l e ,report, which indicates whether a subject would report
illegal ﬁshing activities to the authorities.12
Given the large proportion of subjects who feel that the rights-allocation process is both corrupt
and unfair, we analyse the role of perceptions of fairness in the allocation of rights by including the
variables, corrupt and unfair.
While the inclusion of variables report, corrupt and unfair is considered important in the context
of an analysis of illegal ﬁshing behaviour, we excluded these variables from the experimental risk
analysis in Section 5, as we assumed them not to be relevant determinants of a subject’s broad risk
proﬁle. As before, the regressions are estimated for various samples: the full sample (columns 1,2
and 5); a sample of full-time ﬁshers (columns 3 and 6); and ﬁnally, a sample of full-time ﬁshers with
rights (columns 4 and 7).
In panel A, the estimated experimental risk parameters (see Section 5) are regressed on the
dependent variable, overﬁsh. The results signify a link between risk aversion and non-compliance:
an increase in the experimental risk measure (as participants become risk averse) translates into
a reduction in the odds of catching illegally (column 1: p-value = 0.001). We therefore anticipate
that more risk-averse subjects, such as females, would more readily comply with ﬁsheries regulation,
while more risk-loving subjects, such as quota holders, would be more likely to catch illegally.
11Common-pool resources are resource systems characterised by subtractability and diﬃculty of exclusion (Ostrom
et al. 1999).
12Subjects were asked the following question: If you knew that someone in your community was ﬁshing more than
their quota, would you report them to the police? Around 51% (277 subjects) answered yes. We have information
on compliance for 244 of these subjects. Speciﬁcally, of these 244 subjects, a minority of around 36% have caught
illegally.
8In this context, not only are females less likely to catch illegally (column 2: p-value = 0.000;
column 5: p-value = 0.000), but females in the ﬁshing industry are less prone to non-compliance
(column 3: p-value = 0.000; column 6: p-value = 0.000). This is also the case for female ﬁshers with
rights (column 4: p-value = 0.000; column 7: p-value = 0.000). These results correspond with the
experimental measure for risk aversion where women were found to be more risk averse. It is clear
that, in terms of policy implications, granting greater access to females has positive implications for
compliance.
The odds of poaching are higher for rights holders (column 2:p−value = 0.068; column 3: p-value
= 0.070: column 5:p−value = 0.033; column 6: p-value = 0.036). Again, this result is compatible
with the result in Table 3, where rights holders are found to be more risk loving.
Subjects who would report illegal ﬁshing activities to the authorities are less likely to catch
illegally (Report) (column 5: p-value=0.012; column 6: p-value = 0.009; column 7: p-value =
0.017).
Finally, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect on poaching from perceptions of fairness: While the coeﬃcient
of corrupt is positive, indicating that subjects who perceive the oﬃcials allocating quotas to be
corrupt are more likely to overﬁsh, this result is only signiﬁcant at the 11% level (column 5:p−value
= 0.106; column 6: p-value = 0.112: column 7:p−value=0.119).
7 Discussion
In this study, we estimate the risk attitudes of a large sample of individuals from various ﬁshing
communities along the west coast of South Africa, using subjects’choices over lotteries with real
monetary prizes. The majority of these individuals are involved in ﬁshing-related activities. We
estimated a CRRA utility function deﬁned over the lottery prize.
Our results indicate that the average participant is moderately risk averse and that risk attitudes
vary with certain socio-demographic variables. In particular, we ﬁnd female ﬁshers to be more risk
averse than their male counterparts. These same subjects are also found to be more likely to comply
with ﬁsheries regulation. Conversely, rights holders are found to be more risk loving and less likely
to comply.
The experimental evidence we have presented in this paper suggests that ﬁshers’ risk preferences
have implications for compliance with ﬁsheries regulation. In particular, we ﬁnd that risk-averse
subjects are less likely to catch illegally relative to their more risk-loving counterparts. From this
analysis we derive three signiﬁcant conclusions:
Female ﬁshers and female ﬁshers with rights are more risk averse than males in the same category.
Given this higher degree of risk aversion, females in the ﬁshing industry are less likely to overhar-
vest relative to male ﬁshers. Correspondence with oﬃcials from Marine and Coastal Management
conﬁrmed this ﬁnding: around 89 women have been charged in connection with poaching in the
Overberg over the past 5 years, compared to 1200 men (personal communication). The implication
is that increasing the presence of females in the industry has positive implications for compliance.
Rights holders are found to be both less risk averse and more likely to engage in illegal ﬁshing
activities than ﬁshers without rights. The idea that rights holders are more predisposed towards ille-
gal ﬁshing activities contradicts the general argument that attaching property rights to individuals,
groups or communities resolves the "tragedy of the commons" and prevents over-exploitation of the
resource by eliminating the root problem of open access (Jentoft et al. 1998). Joubert et al (2008)
argue that a quota system reduces overﬁshing by constraining ﬁsher eﬀort and preventing the derby
eﬀect whereby, in the absence of individual allocations, ﬁshers harvest as much of the season’s quota
as possible. However, our results indicate that granting rights to a resource does not necessarily
translate into sustainable resource usage; rather rights holders — who have a legitimate reason to be
a ts e a—a r ep r o v i d e dw i t ha no p p o r t u n i t yt oo v e r h a r v e s t .
Just less than 80% of subjects believe the rights allocation process to be unfair while 70% believe
9the oﬃcials allocating rights to be corrupt. However, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant increase in poaching
amid perceptions of "unfairness." Hauck (2009) provides an overview of the role of legitimacy on
compliance: speciﬁcally, that the obligation to comply with ﬁsheries regulation is eroded when
the regulation is perceived as unjust. In this context, we would expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect
from perceptions of unfairness. We surmise that, given the pervasiveness of unfairness perceptions
throughout the sample, such perceptions are not actual determinants of illegal activities. For exam-
ple, of those who have caught illegally, 78% believe the oﬃcials allocating rights to be corrupt while
87% believe the process to be unfair. In the case of those subjects who have not caught illegally, the
corresponding percentages are 68% and 76%, respectively.
Conversely, subjects who would report illegal ﬁshing activities to the authorities are found to
be less likely to engage in illegal ﬁshing activities. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) use evidence from
the lab to consider the emergence and enforcement of social norms and the factors underlying co-
operative behaviour. The authors note that evidence from public good experiments indicates that
contribution rates are higher than is predicted by economic theory, but that cooperation declines
over time when non-cooperation goes unpunished. However, the introduction of sanctioning oppor-
tunities and associated sanctioning behaviour signiﬁcantly enhances cooperation. The authors ﬁnd
that a credible threat of sanctions is critical to sustain cooperative behaviour. We refer to subjects
who are willing to sanction below-average contributors as norm enforcers. In the context of this pa-
per, a norm enforcer is an individual who would report someone engaging in illegal ﬁshing activities
to the police. Our results suggest that norm enforcers are more likely to adhere to the social norm
of refraining from illegal ﬁshing activities. Strengthening the norm-enforcement capacity of locals
in the ﬁshing industry could thus have positive implications for compliance. Given the pervasive
perception that the allocation process is both corrupt and unfair, and the potential for enhanced
norm enforcement capacity to impact positively on compliance, resource management might well
beneﬁt from a partnership arrangement whereby resource users are involved in the design, imple-
mentation and enforcement of ﬁsheries regulation, as well as the allocation of ﬁshing rights (Hauck
and Sowman 2001).
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Table 1: Sample Statistics by Community 
Variable  ALL  Com 1  Com 2  Com 3  Com 4  Com 5  Com 6  Com 7  Com 8  Com 9 
  n=555  n=44  n=103  n=103  n=21  n=8  n=68  n=88  n=21  n=99 
Male (%)  0.59  0.91  0.50  0.17  0.52  0.88  0.59  0.99  0.67  0.58 
Coloured (%)  0.66  0.61  0.74  0.62  0.60  0.75  0.61  0.60  0.52  0.77 
White (%)  0.02  0.20  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02 
Black (%)  0.17  0.20  0.16  0.13  0.15  0.00  0.23  0.20  0.19  0.19 
Indian (%)  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Other (%)  0.14  0.00  0.10  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.16  0.20  0.29  0.02 
Afrikaans %)  0.88  0.51  0.75  0.99  1.00  1.00  0.91  1.00  1.00  0.85 
English (%)  0.09  0.44  0.24  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07 
Xhosa (%)  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.08 
Age  40.30  50.41  38.03  39.01  49.10  59.13  32.87  43.27  54.24  35.56 
  (13.54)  (12.79)  (12.22)  (12.99)  (18.31)  (4.52)  (12.15)  (11.25)  (11.98)  (10.08) 
Yrs. in 
Community 
30.31  30.66  27.90  31.16  29.20  26.58  27.35  36.13  40.90  27.14 
(13.05)  (18.85)  (7.83)  (13.65)  (8.26)  (9.11)  (11.10)  (14.32)  (12.92)  (11.97) 
HH size  5.13  4.24  5.48  5.00  5.10  5.86  5.15  5.75  4.62  4.76 
  (2.34)  (2.39)  (2.31)  (2.14)  (2.17)  (3.34)  (2.11)  (2.77)  (1.68)  (2.13) 
Yrs. education  8.35  7.45  8.18  8.94  7.05  5.50  9.00  8.13  7.80  8.68 
(2.42)  (2.09)  (2.33)  (2.34)  (3.04)  (1.75)  (1.81)  (2.63)  (1.87)  (2.44) 
Employ.  (%)  0.48  0.63  0.50  0.57  0.29  0.38  0.49  0.58  0.33  0.31 
Fisher (%)  0.68  0.91  0.68  0.50  0.48  0.75  0.56  0.94  0.52  0.70 
HH per capita 
Inc. 
332.84  652.58  290.15  344.23  509.34  464.84  165.99  300.36  349.21  334.10 
(460.12)  (991.70)  (392.09)  (340.05)  (565.57)  (430.66)  (139.94)  (419.04)  (346.92)  (386.47) 
HH per capita 
Exp. 
382.83  531.18  373.23  360.25  737.99  106.25  177.74  433.90  317.91  420.24 
(442.09)  (432.66)  (408.61)  (264.86)  (698.65)  (0.00)  (119.80)  (673.96)  (305.45)  (409.69) 
Quota (%)
1  0.30  0.18  0.42  0.26  0.19  0.13  0.24  0.39  0.29  0.30 
Permit (%)
1  0.44  0.50  0.54  0.21  0.43  0.13  0.43  0.69  0.38  0.34 
Rights (%)
1  0.46  0.50  0.56  0.26  0.43  0.13  0.43  0.74  0.27  0.39 
Corrupt (%)  0.70  0.68  0.71  0.67  0.76  1.00  0.65  0.77  0.71  0.68 
Unfair (%)  0.78  0.73  0.73  0.76  0.71  0.88  0.81  0.89  0.86  0.75 
Note: 




Table 2: Experimental design 
 
Task  Lottery A  Lottery B  EV
A  EV
B 
1  R 20  0.5 of R20; 0.5 of R0  R 20  R 10 
2  R 15  0.5 of R20; 0.5 of R0  R 15  R 10 
3  R 12  0.5 of R20; 0.5 of R0  R 12  R 10 
4  R 10  0.5 of R20; 0.5 of R0  R 10  R 10 
5  R 8  0.5 of R20; 0.5 of R0  R 8  R 10 
6  R 6  0.5 of R20; 0.5 of R0  R 6  R 10 
7  R 4  0.5 of R20; 0.5 of R0  R 4  R 10 




Table 3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of CRRA utility function 
 
  A  B  C  D 
  All  All  Fisher  Fisher with 
rights 
         
Constant  0.393**  -0.503  -0.171  0.271 
  (0.028)  (0.367)  (0.377)  (0.458) 
Age  -  0.023**  0.021**  -0.000 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Age squared  -  -0.000**  -0.000*  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Education  -  0.098**  0.085*  0.091* 
  (0.040)  (0.045)  (0.048) 
Education sq  -  -0.005***  -0.004**  -0.004** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Female  -  0.255***  0.266***  0.300** 
  (0.088)  (0.095)  (0.130) 
Race  -  -0.111*  -0.097  -0.077 
  (0.060)  (0.066)  (0.068) 
Unemployed  -  0.111  0.064  0.016 
  (0.070)  (0.067)  (0.079) 
Breadwinner    -0.058  -0.077  -0.019 
    (0.065)  (0.070)  (0.088) 
Income  -  -0.008  -0.011  -0.042 
  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.032) 
Fisher  -  0.184*  -  -    (0.095) 
Rights  -  -0.139**  -0.131**  -    (0.069)  (0.067) 
Relative inc.  -  -0.064  -0.097  -0.139 
  (0.086)  (0.085)  (0.096) 
Log pseudo-
likelihood  -2594  -1379  -1140  -937 
No. of obs.  4440  2416  2024  1640 
Wald chi(df )  -  215.04(12)  130.14(11)  88.62(10) 
Prob>chi2  -  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes:  Observations  are  multiples  of  8  given  that  each  subject  provided  8  lottery 
choices; robust standard errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denotes significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Analysis of those catching illegally 
Variables   % 
N=180   
Male  83 
Female  17 
Employed  54 
Unemployed  46 
Fisher  88 
Fishing rights  79 
Allocation process perceived to be corrupt  78 
Allocation process perceived to be unfair   87 
 
 
Table 5: Logistic regression estimates, catching illegally 
 
  A  B  C 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  All  All  Fisher  Fisher with 
rights  All  Fisher  Fisher 
with rights 
Exp risk  0.098***             
  (0.072)             
Female    0.177***  0.149***  0.146***  0.208***  0.165***  0.155*** 
    (0.061)  (0.055)  (0.060)  (0.077)  (0.066)  (0.070) 
Fisher    2.463      2.688     
    (1.519)      (1.844)     
Rights    1.987*  2.012*    2.375**  2.441**   
    (0.746)  (0.775)    (0.964)  (1.040)   
Report          0.458**  0.418***  0.421** 
          (0.143)  (0.139)  (0.153) 
Corrupt          1.858  1.901  1.962 
          (0.711)  (0.769)  (0.848) 
Unfair          0.842  0.856  0.647 
          (0.366)  (0.399)  (0.351) 
No. Of obs.  287  287  247  202  265  230  190 

















2  0.028  0.164  0.148  0.130  0.185  0.181  0.164 
Note: All regressions in panels B and C include controls for age, education, race, employment status, income, 
relative  income  and  breadwinner  status;  robust  standard  errors  in  parenthesis;*,  **  and  *  **  denotes 
significance at the10%,  5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Appendix A: Instructions for Players 
We will begin the first experiment, which involves real money. You will be asked to make a number 
of repeated choices. We will only pay you for one of the choices you make in this exercise. However, 
you do not know yet for which of the choices we will pay you, so you must think about each question 
very carefully. You will only find out at the end of today’s session for which of these questions you 
are going to be paid . So, it is in your interest to treat each of the choices as if this were the only 
choice you made and as if this is the question for which you are going to be paid. Is this clear? 
The questions deal with whether you prefer to have a smaller amount of money for sure, OR a 
larger amount of money where there is some risk that you end up not getting anything.  
You can never lose any money irrespective of what you choose. 
For example, consider the following two options: 
Option A: You get R10 for sure.   OR 
Option B: We will flip a coin. If it comes up heads, you will get R20. However, if it comes up tails 
you will get nothing.  
If you choose Option A, you know what you get for sure. If you choose Option B, where we flip a 
coin, you might get R20, but there is also some chance you will get nothing. 
We  will  now  ask  you  8  questions  like  these,  but  with  different  numbers.  These  differences  are 
important. Remember, the best you can do is to think carefully about each question as if it were 
the only choice you made.  
Once you have made your 8 choices, I will collect your forms. At the end of today’s session, we will 
ask one of you to draw a number between 1 and 8 out of a bag. Whichever number is picked from 
the bag will be the choice that counts for you. 
If you decided to take the money for sure, that is the amount you will get. But if you decided to flip 
the coin, we will then flip the coin. If it comes up heads, you will win R20, but if the coin comes up 
tails, you will not win anything. 
Is this clear? Are there any questions before we begin? 
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Appendix B: Experimental design 
 
Question 1:  Which alternative do you choose? (Tick the relevant box.) 
 Option A: You get R20 for sure.  
 Option B: Flip a coin: If coin comes up heads, you get R20, if it comes up tails, you get nothing. 
Question 2:  Which alternative do you choose? (Tick the relevant box.) 
 Option A: You get R15 for sure.  
 Option B: Flip a coin: If coin comes up heads, you get R20, if it comes up tails, you get nothing. 
Question 3:  Which alternative do you choose? (Tick the relevant box.) 
 Option A: You get R12 for sure.  
 Option B: Flip a coin: If coin comes up heads, you get R20, if it comes up tails, you get nothing. 
Question 4:  Which alternative do you choose? (Tick the relevant box.) 
 Option A: You get R10 for sure.  
 Option B: Flip a coin: If coin comes up heads, you get R20, if it comes up tails, you get nothing. 
Question 5:  Which alternative do you choose? (Tick the relevant box.) 
 Option A: You get R8 for sure.  
 Option B: Flip a coin: If coin comes up heads, you get R20, if it comes up tails, you get nothing. 
Question 6:  Which alternative do you choose? (Tick the relevant box.) 
 Option A: You get R6 for sure.  
 Option B: Flip a coin: If coin comes up heads, you get R20; if it comes up tails, you get nothing. 
Question 7:  Which alternative do you choose? (Tick the relevant box.) 
 Option A: You get R4 for sure.  
 Option B: Flip a coin: If coin comes up heads, you get R20; if it comes up tails, you get nothing. 
Question 8:  Which alternative do you choose? (Tick the relevant box.) 
 Option A: You get R2 for sure.  
 Option B: Flip a coin: If coin comes up heads, you get R20; if it comes up tails, you get nothing. 
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